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Abstract—The TinyOS concurrency model, although easier to
reason about than shared-state threads, may still produce
undesirable behavior as a result of unexpected interleaving
of concurrent activities. This is problematic, since TinyOS
applications are typically intended to run unattended for long
periods of time, and must be reliable. In this paper, we
describe a technique for modeling the interactions between
TinyOS application components, and between an application
and the TinyOS scheduling and preemption mechanisms, using
the process algebra CSP. Analysis of the resulting process
models can help TinyOS application developers to discover and
diagnose concurrency-related errors in their designs that might
otherwise go undetected until deployment of the application.
Keywords—TinyOS; Concurrency; Process algebra.
I. INTRODUCTION
TinyOS [1] is a popular operating system for embedded
sensor networks. TinyOS and the applications that run on it
are written in nesC [2], a dialect of C that adds support for a
component-based programming model. TinyOS applications
are constructed as a graph of components that interact both
with each other, and with the underlying TinyOS scheduler
and platform hardware. Ensuring that all of these interactions
occur correctly is an important aspect of developing a
reliable TinyOS application.
Gaining an understanding of how TinyOS application
components interact with each other is complicated by
the inclusion of concurrency within the TinyOS model of
computation [3]. Concurrency is introduced into TinyOS by
interrupts, which can cause one component to preempt the
execution of another, and by tasks, which are a way for
components to defer the execution of operations that are not
time-critical. Care has been taken in the design of TinyOS
and nesC to reduce the likelihood of concurrency-related
errors, for example by including race-condition checks in
the nesC compiler, and using a run-to-completion execution
model for tasks. Nevertheless, interrupts and tasks both
introduce the possibility of unanticipated interleavings of
different activities, which may cause undesirable application
behavior. For example, consider the following snippet of
nesC, which is intended to repeatedly execute an activity by
using a task to start the activity again each time completion
of the previous execution of the activity is signaled:
command void RepeatedActivity.stop()
{ call Activity.stop(); }
event void Activity.done()
{ post next(); }
task void next()
{ call Activity.start(); }
The cycle of repeated executions will usually stop when
RepeatedActivity.stop() is called, because stopping
the activity will prevent the Activity.done() event that
triggers a new execution from being signaled. However,
should RepeatedActivity.stop() be called after the
next() task has been posted to the scheduler, but before it
has been executed, the execution cycle will not stop: later
execution of next() will restart the cycle even though
the RepeatedActivity.stop() command has been exe-
cuted. This erroneous behavior results from an unanticipated
interleaving of the concurrent stop and restart activities.
In this paper, we show how TinyOS application developers
can shed light on potential concurrency-related problems
in their application designs by using the process algebra
CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) [4]:
• We define a mapping from nesC programs to CSP pro-
cess models (section III-B). This mapping formalizes
the component interactions within a nesC program. As
part of the mapping, we define several processes that
ease the translation from nesC to CSP, by providing a
nesC-like syntactic sugar over the underlying process
model (section III-C).
• We develop a CSP model of TinyOS task-scheduling
and preemption (section III-D). This model clarifies the
execution semantics of TinyOS, and allows interactions
between TinyOS applications and the TinyOS concur-
rency mechanisms to be analyzed.
• We demonstrate how our nesC to CSP mapping and
model of the TinyOS concurrency mechanisms can be
used together to model and analyze TinyOS applica-
tions using off-the-shelf tools (section IV).
The CSP approach described in this paper offers several
features not found in previous approaches to analyzing
TinyOS applications, which we discuss in section V.
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II. TINYOS AND NESC
TinyOS is an embedded operating system developed to
meet the needs of programming resource-constrained em-
bedded networks [1]. It consists of a large collection of
components that implement services useful in networked
embedded systems, such as communications, timing, and
lightweight task scheduling. TinyOS is not a hard real-time
operating system, but provides a component-based, event-
driven programming model within a very small footprint.
The nesC language was created to support TinyOS [2].
Reflecting TinyOS’ component-based philosophy, nesC pro-
grams are structured as compositions of interacting com-
ponents. These components come in two flavors: modules,
which implement specific functionality, and configurations,
which define connections between components.
Each nesC component has one or more interfaces, which
consist of commands and events. Commands are used to
request that a component perform some service, while events
are a mechanism for signaling to a component that an
activity it requested has been completed, or that an external
phenomenon such as an interrupt has occurred. A component
that provides an interface must implement functions for each
command in the interface, and may signal any of the events,
while a component that uses an interfaces must implement
functions to handle each event in the interface, and may call
any of the commands. Configuration components connect
(“wire”) interface providers to interface users.
Again reflecting the needs of TinyOS, the behavior of
nesC programs is largely event-driven. Hardware interrupts
can trigger events, the effects of which propagate up the
component graph as a cascade of further events. Event-
handling functions may also make command calls back
down the component graph as part of the overall system
response to the initiating event. In situations where the
response to an event is not time-critical, the overall respon-
siveness of the application may be improved by deferring
execution of the response until the processor is idle. Deferred
execution is achieved by posting a task that implements the
activities to be deferred.
TinyOS includes a simple task scheduler that maintains a
FIFO queue of pending tasks, which are executed whenever
the processor is not occupied responding to an interrupt. The
scheduler is non-preemptive, and executes each task in a run-
to-completion manner. Operations executed by the scheduler
are referred to as synchronous. This style of execution makes
tasks atomic with respect to each other, and thereby prevents
data races between tasks. However, task execution can be
preempted by interrupt-triggered asynchronous events, so
nesC also includes the capability to define atomic code
blocks which are protected from preemption.
The concurrency introduced by tasks and interrupts in-
creases the difficulty of making TinyOS applications reli-
able, because developers must anticipate all of the possi-
ble interleavings of concurrent activities. The reliability of
TinyOS applications can be improved prior to deployment
by subjecting the application to simulation via TOSSIM [3],
unit testing [5], and perhaps lab testing. But uncovering
concurrency-related errors via testing and simulation is a
difficult task, due to the timing sensitivity of many concur-
rency errors. Furthermore, even if an error is found during
testing, pinning down the actual source of the problem can
be a time-consuming process. It’s therefore worthwhile to
consider other options for analyzing the concurrent behavior
of TinyOS applications.
III. CSP MODELS OF TINYOS APPLICATIONS
Model-checking is a technique for discovering errors in
a design by systematically exploring the state-space of an
abstract model of the design [6]. In order to apply model-
checking techniques to TinyOS applications, it’s necessary
to abstract the application design into a formal model that
is amenable to model-checking. We have opted to use the
process algebra CSP as our modeling formalism, since
its characteristics are well-matched to those of nesC and
TinyOS:
• TinyOS applications are concurrent; CSP is designed
to model concurrent systems.
• TinyOS applications are event-driven; CSP is an event-
based formalism.
• TinyOS applications are hierarchical compositions of
components; CSP process models are hierarchical com-
positions of processes.
• TinyOS applications are composed by wiring together
interfaces; CSP processes are composed by wiring
together channels.
We build on the intuitive correspondence between nesC
programs and CSP processes to develop a systematic map-
ping from nesC to CSP, and add models of the TinyOS task-
scheduler and preemption rules to construct CSP processes
that model TinyOS applications.
A. Introducing CSP
CSP [4] is a mathematical theory of concurrency and
interaction, in which concurrent systems are modeled as col-
lections of event-transition systems (processes) that interact
by synchronizing on shared events. CSP events are abstract
symbolic representations of interactions. For example, a
model of an online purchase might include events that
represent ordering an item, confirming the order, providing
payment, and shipping the ordered item. Interfaces between
processes can be defined using channels which carry values
of some specified type; each occurrence of a value being
passed through a channel corresponds to a single event.
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Simple sequential processes are defined by using the
prefix operator → to specify sequences of events, e.g.
OnlinePurchase =
order?item→ confirm!item→
request payment!cost(item)→
receive payment?p→ ship!item→ SKIP
where ? and ! indicate channel input and output respectively,
and SKIP is a primitive process representing successful
termination. Observant readers will have noted that the
online purchase process has the unfortunate habit of shipping
an item regardless of the amount of payment received.
Fortunately, the CSP process notation also provides a variety
of other operators for defining behaviors, such as:
• Conditionals (if p = cost(item) then . . . else . . .)
• Alternatives (DisplayCart ! DisplayCatalog)
• Nondeterministic outcomes (Transaction " Error)
• Process sequence (Server(x) = Login; Hello; . . .)
• Parallelism (Servers = Server(1) ||| Server(2))
• Interfaces (Customer |[OrderEvents ]| Servers)
CSP includes a rich theory of process refinement and
equivalence based on analyzing the sequences of events that
processes can be observed to perform. The FDR2 model-
checker [7] is an industrial-strength analysis tool that can
be used to automatically check CSP models for properties
such as deadlock or livelock, and to evaluate process models
for conformance to specifications.
B. Mapping nesC to CSP
Since we’re interested in finding errors in component
interactions within a TinyOS application, our mapping from
nesC to CSP focuses on modeling the execution of nesC
commands and events. We model nesC components as CSP
processes that interact through CSP events which represent
nesC commands, events, and task control functions.
1) CSP Event Structure: The CSP events that represent
nesC commands and events are compound symbols which
encode information about the command or event, the inter-
face and component with which it is associated, and the exe-
cution context (synchronous or asynchronous). For example,
initiation of the read() command from the Read interface
by a component SenseC during synchronous execution is
represented by the event exec.begin.SenseC.Read read.sync.
Although it’s tempting to map execution of a nesC com-
mand or event directly to a single CSP event, such a mapping
would not allow us to accurately represent the behavior
of command/event execution. Commands and events in
nesC are both compiled down to C functions [8]. Thus a
command that calls another command will not complete
its execution until the second command finishes executing,
and control returns to the first command. To reproduce the
behavior of function calls in our CSP model, we represent
command/event execution as a pair of events that indicate
the beginning and end of an execution.
In general then, nesC commands and events are repre-
sented by the CSP events associated with the exec channel:
channel exec : Exec.NesC Function.SyncType
where the types
datatype Exec = begin | complete
datatype SyncType = sync | async | hw async
contain symbols that encode the execution step and context.
The use of SyncType will become clear when we introduce
modeling of interrupt preemption in section III-D.
The NesC Function type that appears in the definition
of exec is a set that depends on the TinyOS application
being modeled. It contains compound symbols that encode
the component and interface of each function (command
or event). We encode interfaces as types that combine
the interface name with the name of each function in the
interface using the format <interface-name> <function-
name>, as in the example in Fig. 1. The full interface of
a component is a type that is a union of the individual
interfaces the component provides and uses, prepended
with the component name to model the component-local
namespaces used in nesC [8]. In the case of interfaces
that are renamed within the component, we incorporate
the new name into the prepended component name (see
Fig. 1). Finally, the NesC Function type is the union of
all component interfaces. For example, for an application
containing the components MainC, SenseC, TimerC, and
SensorC, the corresponding NesC Function is:
nametype NesC Function =⋃{MainC IF, SenseC IF,TimerC IF, SensorC IF}
We model task-related operations using a style similar to
that used to model commands and events. Posting of tasks
to the scheduler is modeled by events associated with the
task post channel, while the initiation and completion of
task execution are modeled as task exec events:
channel task post : Task
channel task exec : Exec.Task
where Task is a datatype specific to the application be-
ing modeled. The Task datatype consists of symbols that
represent each task in the application, defined using the
form <component-name> task <task-name>. For exam-
ple, the task symbol for a module SensorC with task
senseResult() would be SensorC task senseResult.
2) Modules: We model modules as processes that provide
a selection of behaviors corresponding to the functions
implemented by the module. By default, functions in TinyOS
are assumed to be synchronous, which means that they can-
not be called during handling of an asynchronous event like
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interface Read<val_t> {
command error_t read();
event void readDone(...);
}
module SenseC {
provides interface SplitControl;
uses interface Read<uint16_t>;
uses interface Timer<TMilli> as MTimer;
} ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
datatype ReadIF = Read read | Read readDone
datatype SenseC IF =
SenseC.
⋃{ReadIF, SplitControIF}
| SenseC MTimer.TimerIF
Figure 1. Datatypes for interfaces
an interrupt. In contrast, functions labeled with the async
keyword can be called from an asynchronous context [9].
To maintain this distinction in our CSP model, we split the
module process into synchronous and asynchronous parts.
The synchronous part is defined as an external choice (!)
over commands, events, and tasks, since we assume that only
one of these can be executing at a time. The asynchronous
part is defined as a parallel composition of processes that
represent individual command or event-handling functions.
The module model itself is then a parallel composition of
the synchronous and asynchronous parts.
The general form of module process models is:
Module <component-name> =
let
SyncFunctions =
<command-1-behavior>; SyncFunctions
! · · ·
! <event-N-behavior>; SyncFunctions
! <task-N-behavior>; SyncFunctions
AsyncFunctions =
let
AsyncF1 =
<async-cmd-1-behavior>; AsyncF1
· · ·
AsyncFN =
<async-event-N-behavior>; AsyncFN
within
AsyncF1 ||| · · · ||| AsyncFN
within
(SyncFunctions ||| AsyncFunctions)
As the examples in section IV show, for simple module
behaviors, the state of a component can be maintained by
arranging the synchronous part of the module process model
as a state transition system. The same technique can be
used to constrain the states in which certain functions are
available, which makes it possible to specify the acceptable
sequences of function calls as part of the module behavior.
The resulting state transition system resembles an interface
automaton [10], and, like an interface automaton, can be
used to check component interface compatibility. In situa-
tions where a state transition system is insufficient to model
the module state, local processes representing variables can
be added to the module process model.
Within a module process, we model the behavior of an
individual function f as the process
FnDef (f ,Body) = exec.begin.f .sync→ Body ;
exec.complete.f .sync→ SKIP
where Body is a process defining the actions performed by
the command or event. Note that FnDef provides a model
for synchronous functions only, since its events are postfixed
with the symbol sync. Since asynchronous functions can be
called from both synchronous and asynchronous contexts,
we require a slightly more complex model to properly
capture their behavior. The process
AsyncFnDef (f ,Body) =
exec.begin.f ?s→
(Body ; exec.complete.f .s→ SKIP)
is similar to FnDef , but keeps track of the SyncType of the
initiating event.
In general, the actions performed in the Body of a function
will be one or more calls to other functions. We use CSP
sequential composition (; ), conditionals (if . . . then), and
recursion to capture control-flow, and model function calls
with the process
FnExec(f , s) = exec.begin.f .s→
exec.complete.f .s→ SKIP
where s is the SyncType of the function call, and indicates
the context of the call. Synchronizing FnExec with a corre-
sponding FnDef process has the effect of triggering execu-
tion of the function f , and blocking the FnExec process until
the body of the FnDef has completed. Blocking FnExec in
this way provides the desired behavior for nested command
and event executions.
The behavior of tasks is modeled in a fashion similar to
that used to model commands and events, as a task body
surrounded by beginning and completion events:
task(t,Body) = task exec.begin.t→ Body ;
task exec.complete.t→ SKIP
Unlike commands or events, task execution is triggered by
the scheduler (section III-D). Tasks are added to the sched-
uler by posting them, an action modeled by the process:
post(t) = task post.t→ SKIP
82
Authorized licensed use limited to: University of Canterbury. Downloaded on May 11, 2009 at 02:02 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
3) Configurations: We model the inter-component con-
nections defined by a configuration as an interface-parallel
composition of component processes synchronizing on
events in their connected interfaces. However, because exec
events are structured to provide each module with its own
namespace (section III-B1), modules do not by themselves
have any events in common. We therefore use the CSP
renaming operator to map events associated with one module
to events associated with the other module. Renaming can
also be used to map the interfaces inside a configuration to
those provided by the configuration.
The wiring of components A and B to each other is
modeled by the process
wiring(A,B,Connections) =
let
SharedIF = {exec.e.IFa.f .s
| (IFa, ,Fns) ∈ Connections,
e ∈ Exec, f ∈ Fns, s ∈ SyncType}
within
(A
|[SharedIF]|
(B[[exec.e.IFb.f ← exec.e.IFa.f
| (IFa, IFb,Fns) ∈ Connections,
e ∈ Exec, f ∈ Fns]]))
where Connections is a set of 3-tuples specifying the in-
terfaces to be connected. The wiring process renames exec
events for IFb.f to make them appear as the corresponding
IFa.f events, and synchronizes the components A and B on
the shared IFa.f events.
Multiple-wiring of interfaces results in fan-in of calls
to the component that is multiply-connected, and fan-out
of calls from that component. Fan-in is well-modeled by
using a multiple-renaming scheme. Modeling fan-out is
slightly more complex, since it is necessary to enforce serial
execution of the fan-out functions. Our approach to modeling
fan-out is to insert an intermediate process between the caller
and the functions called in the fan-out. This approach re-
sembles the nesC compiler’s use of intermediate functions to
implement fan-out [9]. Space constraints preclude presenting
the fan-out intermediate process.
C. Easing the Translation
The mapping described above provides a way to model
nesC programs in CSP, but could be easier to use. To clarify
the relationship between nesC programs and our CSP model,
we define several auxiliary processes that overlay the basic
process model with a “syntactic sugar” that more closely
matches nesC syntax. For synchronous functions and calls,
we define the processes
command(f ,Body) = FnDef (f ,Body)
event(f ,Body) = FnDef (f ,Body)
call(f ) = FnExec(f , sync)
signal(f ) = FnExec(f , sync)
which allow us to translate the SenseC event
event void MilliTimer.fired()
{ call Read.read(); }
into the process
event(SenseC MilliTimer.Timer fired,
call(SenseC.Read read))
Similarly, for asynchronous functions, and calls from
asynchronous contexts, we define the processes
async command(f ,Body) = AsyncFnDef (f ,Body)
async event(f ,Body) = AsyncFnDef (f ,Body)
async call(f ) = FnExec(f , async)
async signal(f ) = FnExec(f , async)
hw async signal(f ) = FnExec(f , async)
D. Scheduling and Preemption Models
TinyOS applications are nesC programs that run in the
context of TinyOS. Given a model of a nesC program
AppComponentGraph, we model the corresponding TinyOS
application as the parallel composition
Application(AppComponentGraph) =
((Configuration MainC
|[{|task post, task exec,
exec.begin.MainC, exec.complete.MainC|}]|
AppComponentGraph)
|[{|start atomic, end atomic, task exec, exec|}]|
AsyncPreemption)
in which Configuration MainC and AppComponentGraph
synchronize on all events prefixed by exec.begin.MainC
or exec.complete.MainC, and all events associated with
the task post and task exec channels, and both processes
synchronize with AsyncPreemption on all events associated
with the channels start atomic, end atomic, task exec, and
exec. The process Configuration MainC is an abstract model
of the TinyOS MainC component. As described below, it
encapsulates the boot process, and the task scheduler. The
process AsyncPreemption, also described below, models the
relationship between synchronous and asynchronous execu-
tion in TinyOS. We developed these models based on exist-
ing informal descriptions of TinyOS execution semantics [8],
and examination of the TinyOS 2.1 source code.
1) MainC and the Scheduler: The TinyOS MainC com-
ponent provides platform and software initialization, and
is also the component in which the TinyOS scheduler
resides [8]. The MainC component has two interfaces,
modeled in CSP as
datatype BootIF = Boot booted
datatype InitIF = Init init
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datatype MainC IF = MainC.BootIF
| MainC SoftwareInit.InitIF
Within MainC, system startup activities are handled by
RealMainP. Following the standard RealMainP mod-
ule [11], we define BootProcess as
BootProcess =
atomic(call(MainC SoftwareInit.Init init) ;
run sched → SKIP) ;
signal(MainC.Boot booted)
Note that BootProcess does not model platform initializa-
tion, but does include software initialization. The meaning
of the atomic() wrapper around software initialization will
be clarified in the discussion of AsyncPreemption.
The MainC process model combines the boot process
model with a model of the scheduler:
Configuration MainC =
BootProcess
|[{exec.begin.MainC.Boot booted.sync, run sched}]|
Scheduler
The interface between BootProcess and Scheduler is used
to prevent tasks from being executed during software ini-
tialization, and to prevent the boot process from signaling
MainC.Boot booted until the scheduler has completed exe-
cuting any tasks posted during initialization.
The Scheduler process models the standard TinyOS FIFO
scheduler. In TinyOS 2.x, posting a task to the scheduler
when it is already enqueued has no effect [8]. Our model
reflects this behavior.
Internally, the Scheduler model is split into several pro-
cesses, each representing a different scheduler state:
Scheduler =
let
SchInit(Q,Postable) = · · ·
SchNext(〈〉, ) = · · ·
SchNext(〈t〉! Q,Postable) = . . .
SchExec(Q,Postable, t) = · · ·
within
SchInit(〈〉,Task)
In the initial state, tasks may be posted to the scheduler,
but are never executed. Tasks are only added to the task
queue if they are in the set of Postable tasks that have not yet
been enqueued. The scheduler transitions to a state in which
tasks can be executed when the run sched event occurs.
SchInit(Q,Postable) =
(run sched → SchNext(Q,Postable))
! (task post?t : Postable→
SchInit(Q! 〈t〉,Postable \ {t}))
! (task post?t′ : (Task \ Postable)→
SchNext(Q,Postable))
If the task queue is empty, then any task can be posted. In
addition, the empty-queue state is the only one in which the
scheduler permits the MainC.Boot booted event to proceed,
thus ensuring that tasks posted during software initialization
are cleared before the boot signal is sent.
SchNext(〈〉, ) =
(task post?t→ SchNext(〈t〉,Task \ {t}))
! (exec.begin.MainC.Boot booted.sync→
SchNext(〈〉,Task))
If the task queue is not empty, the task at the head of the
queue is executed. New tasks may also be posted. Note that
a task becomes postable as soon as it has started executing.
This allows tasks to post themselves.
SchNext(〈t〉! Q,Postable) =
(task exec.begin!t→
SchExec(Q,Postable ∪ {t}, t)
! (task post?t′ : Postable→
SchNext(〈t〉! Q! 〈t′〉,Postable \ {t′}))
! (task post?t′′ : (Task \ Postable)→
SchNext(〈t〉! Q,Postable))
Finally, when the scheduler is executing a task, it waits
for the task to complete before returning to a state in which
it is ready to execute another task.
SchExec(Q,Postable, t) =
(task exec.complete.t→ SchNext(Q,Postable))
! (task post?t′ : Postable→
SchExec(Q! 〈t′〉,Postable \ {t′}, t))
! (task post?t′′ : (Task \ Postable)→
SchExec(Q,Postable, t))
2) Preemption: The AsyncPreemption process models
preemption of synchronous execution. It does this by block-
ing the events associated with synchronous functions when-
ever an interrupt event occurs. We split AsyncPreemption
into two execution states, which represent synchronous and
asynchronous execution:
AsyncPreemption =
let
SyncExec(inAtomic) = · · ·
AsyncExec({}, inAtomic) = · · ·
AsyncExec(Active, inAtomic) = · · ·
within
SyncExec(false)
Each execution state places constraints on the func-
tions that the application can execute. To apply these con-
straints, AsyncPreemption process synchronizes with the
scheduler and application models on all events associated
with the task exec and exec channels, i.e., AllActions =
{|task exec, exec|}. Because tasks can be posted from an
asynchronous context AsyncPreemption does not place any
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constraints on task post events. We divide the events in
AllActions into three categories: hw async events that rep-
resent interrupts, function calls made from asynchronous
contexts, and events that are permissible in a synchronous
context and don’t indicate an interrupt:
HwActions = {exec.e.f .hw async
| e ∈ Exec, f ∈ NesC Function}
AsyncActions = {exec.e.f .async
| e ∈ Exec, f ∈ NesC Function}
SyncActions = AllActions \ HwActions
Within both execution states, the application can prevent
preemption from occurring by declaring an atomic block.
The transition into and out of an atomic block is com-
municated to the AsyncPreemption model via the events
start atomic and end atomic. These events are used in the
application model to define an atomic block via the process
atomic(Block) = start atomic→ Block ;
end atomic→ SKIP
The synchronous execution state permits both task exe-
cution and execution of any function. If the application is
not in an atomic block then interrupt events may occur, in
which case the appropriate interrupt handler is invoked, and
execution transitions to the asynchronous state.
SyncExec(inAtomic) =
(! s : SyncActions • s→ SyncExec(inAtomic))
! (¬ inAtomic & exec.begin?i : IntHandlers→
AsyncExec({i}, false))
! (start atomic→ SyncExec(true))
! (end atomic→ SyncExec(false))
The set IntHandlers ⊆ HwActions is the set of all
interrupt-handling functions included in the application.
In the asynchronous execution state, AsyncPreemption is
only prepared to proceed with those events that are permitted
in an asynchronous context. Again, if the application is not
in an atomic block then interrupt events may occur, in which
case the new interrupt is added to the set of active interrupts.
When all active interrupt handlers have completed, execution
returns to the synchronous state.
AsyncExec({}, inAtomic) = SyncExec(inAtomic)
AsyncExec(Active, inAtomic) =
(! a : AsyncActions • a→
AsyncExec(Active, inAtomic))
! (exec.complete?i : Active→
AsyncExec(Active \ {i}, inAtomic))
! ((¬ inAtomic ∧ #Active < MAX) &
exec.begin?i : (IntHandlers \ Active)→
AsyncExec(Active ∪ {i}, inAtomic))
! (start atomic→ AsyncExec(Active, true))
! (end atomic→ AsyncExec(Active, false))
Note that the model presented here does not support
nested atomic blocks (these are typically optimized away
by the nesC compiler [8]), and allows multiple interrupt-
handlers to interleave their actions.
IV. EXAMPLE: RADIOSENSE APPLICATION
Now that we have both a mapping from nesC programs
to CSP processes, and a model of TinyOS scheduling and
preemption, we’re ready to look at an example CSP model
of a TinyOS application, and how that model can be used
to analyze the component interactions within the applica-
tion. As our example application, we use RadioSense, a
stripped-down version of the RadioSenseToLeds applica-
tion distributed with TinyOS. The RadioSense application
eliminates the packet reception and LED control functions
found in RadioSenseToLeds, and performs only the
sensing and radio transmission functions. Our analysis of
the application focuses on checking that it performs these
functions, and does so correctly.
A. Model
As with any modeling effort, we make some simplifying
assumptions to ease model construction:
1) We assume that it is always possible to create a packet.
2) We use abstract models of the TinyOS components
that are connected to the core application module.
These models approximate the behavior of the actual
TinyOS components, but avoid modeling complex
internal implementation details or virtualization layers.
Even with these simplifying assumptions the complete
model is too large to present here. We have made the full
CSP model available at http://coweb.elec.canterbury.ac.nz/
cda/uploads/ tos-app-exmpl.csp, and present only the top-
level application model in full detail here.
Figs. 2 and 3 show the top-level configuration of the
RadioSense application, and an abbreviated version of
the core module. The RadioSenseC module periodically
reads a sensor and transmits the sensed data, using the state
variable locked to track whether the radio is in use. The
CSP process models corresponding to the nesC code appear
in Figs. 4 and 5. Note that MainC is not included in the
configuration model, because it is already part of our TinyOS
model, and that AMSenderC is wired to ActiveMessageC in
an approximation of the actual TinyOS implementation.
Since our analysis of the RadioSenseC application is
focused on data sensing and transmission, it is useful to un-
derstand something about how data transmission is modeled.
Transmission is initiated by calling the send command on the
AMSenderC component, which relays the command down to
ActiveMessageC. Beneath the ActiveMessageC component
is a simple radio behavior model that abstracts from the
details of medium-access and message-content, and uses tx
events to represent the start and end of externally observable
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configuration RadioSenseAppC {}
implementation {
components MainC, RadioSenseC as App;
components new DemoSensorC();
components ActiveMessageC;
components new AMSenderC(...);
components new TimerMilliC();
App.Boot -> MainC.Boot;
App.AMSend -> AMSenderC;
App.RadioControl -> ActiveMessageC;
App.MilliTimer -> TimerMilliC;
App.Packet -> AMSenderC;
App.Read -> DemoSensorC;
}
Figure 2. RadioSenseAppC configuration
module RadioSenseC {
uses {
interface Boot;
interface AMSend;
interface Timer<TMilli> as MilliTimer;
interface Packet;
interface Read<uint16_t>;
interface SplitControl as RadioControl;
}
}
implementation {
...
bool locked = FALSE;
event void Boot.booted()
{ call RadioControl.start(); }
event void RadioControl.startDone(...)
{ call MilliTimer.startPeriodic(250); }
event void RadioControl.stopDone(...) {}
event void MilliTimer.fired()
{ call Read.read(); }
event void Read.readDone(...) {
if (locked) {
return;
} else {
...
call AMSend.send(...);
locked = TRUE;
}
}
event void AMSend.sendDone(...)
{ locked = FALSE; }
}
Figure 3. RadioSenseC module
Configuration RadioSenseAppC =
let
Components =
(Module TimerC ||| Module DemoSensorC)
||| (wiring(Module AMSenderC,
Configuration ActiveMessageC,
{(AMSenderC AM,
ActiveMessageC,
AMSendIF)}))
within
wiring(Module RadioSenseC,Components,
{(RadioSenseC,AMSenderC,AMSendIF),
(RadioSenseC RadioControl,
ActiveMessageC, SplitControlIF),
(RadioSenseC MilliTimer,
TimerC,TimerIF),
(RadioSenseC,AMSenderC,PacketIF),
(RadioSenseC,DemoSensorC,ReadIF)})
[[exec.e.RadioSenseC.f .s← exec.e.MainC.f .s
| e ∈ Exec, f ∈ BootIF, s ∈ SyncType]]
Figure 4. RadioSenseAppC CSP model
radio transmissions. The radio has two states: idle and
transmitting. If an attempt to send a new message is made
while the radio is in the transmitting state, an error will
occur. The radio behavior model is:
Module RadioHW =
let
Idle =
async command(RadioHW.Radio txStart,
tx.start→ SKIP); Tx
Tx =
(async command(RadioHW.Radio txStart,
tx.err → SKIP); STOP)
! (tx.end → hw async signal(
RadioHW.Radio txDone); Idle)
within
Idle
Upon completion of a transmission, the txDone interrupt
triggers a function in the ActiveMessageP module, which in
turns posts a task to the scheduler.
TxDone =
async event(ActiveMessageP.Radio txDone,
post(ActiveMessageP task sendDone)); TxDone
Execution of the task causes the sendDone event to be
signaled to AMSenderC, and thence to RadioSenseC.
The sensor behavior model, like the radio model, is an
abstract representation of sensor behavior. It is triggered by
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Module RadioSenseC =
let
State(locked) =
(event(RadioSenseC.Boot booted, call(RadioSenseC RadioControl.SplitControl start)); State(locked))
! (event(RadioSenseC RadioControl.SplitControl startDone,
call(RadioSenseC MilliTimer.Timer startPeriodic)); State(locked))
! (event(RadioSenseC RadioControl.SplitControl stopDone, SKIP); State(locked))
! (event(RadioSenseC MilliTimer.Timer fired, call(RadioSenseC.Read read)); State(locked))
! (event(RadioSenseC.Read readDone,
if ¬ locked then (call(RadioSenseC.AMSend send)) else SKIP); State(true))
! (event(RadioSenseC.AMSend sendDone, SKIP); State(false))
within
State(false)
Figure 5. RadioSenseC module CSP model
read commands from RadioSenseC, and posts a task which
signals completion of the read operation:
task(DemoSensorC task senseResult,
signal(DemoSensorC.Read readDone))
B. Analysis
We use FDR2 to check that the RadioSense application
will sense and transmit data, and do so without generating
errors. We express this check as an assertion that the
application model refines an abstract process which is always
ready to perform at least one of the events tx.start, tx.end,
or task post.DemoSensorC task senseResult, but will never
perform tx.err:
DF(A) = " a : A • a→ DF(A)
E = {|tx, task post.DemoSensorC task senseResult|}
assert DF(E \ {tx.err}) *FD
Application RadioSenseAppC \ (Σ \ E)
Checking the assertion with FDR2 confirms that the
application model performs the sensing and transmission
functions without error. Of course, a positive result is not all
that interesting. As an example of error detection, suppose
that a developer had decided to create a version of the
RadioSenseC module that did not use the locked vari-
able. Substituting a model of the alternative RadioSenseC
in place ofModule RadioSenseC, and checking the assertion
assert DF(E \ {tx.err}) *FD
Application BadRadioSenseAppC \ (Σ \ E)
shows that the new module will cause an error to occur.
Examination of the counterexample trace produced by FDR2
reveals the cause of the error: the new RadioSenseC
module may try to transmit a second sensor reading before
transmission of the first has completed. The analysis has thus
detected a possible interleaving of data processing activities
with radio transmission activities that produces undesirable
application behavior, and has illuminated the rationale for
including the locked variable in RadioSenseC.
V. RELATED WORK
The work most closely related to ours is probably Rosa
and Cunha’s [12] effort to formalize nesC programs using
LOTOS. Similar work by Vo¨lgyesi et al. [10] proposed
the use of hierarchical interface automata to analyze nesC
component interactions. Our CSP modeling approach draws
inspiration from both efforts. It extends that earlier work by
using a dual-event model of function-calls that gives a more
accurate representation of nesC execution, and by adding
models of TinyOS scheduling and preemption to facilitate
analysis of their impact on application behavior.
Xie et al. [13] have proposed using the COSPAN model-
checker for co-verification of TinyOS applications and plat-
form hardware. Their approach to modeling TinyOS appli-
cations in the S/R language includes a model of TinyOS
scheduling and preemption. However, their scheduler model
differs from ours in that it directly controls the execution of
each individual function-call, whereas our scheduler model
more closely resembles the actual TinyOS task scheduler,
which is responsible for coordinating task execution but does
not directly control function-call sequencing.
Kothari et al. [14] recently developed a technique for
extracting state-machines from TinyOS programs using sym-
bolic execution. The resulting state-machines provide an ab-
stracted view of the TinyOS program. In principle, symbolic
execution could also be used to check the TinyOS program
for desirable properties. However, doing so would require
extending Kothari’s method with some kind of specification
language for defining the properties, and with a mechanism
for checking those specifications during symbolic execution.
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An alternative to static analysis of interaction models is
runtime analysis of the component interactions themselves.
To support such analysis, Archer et al. [15] recently pro-
posed the addition of interface contract specifications to
TinyOS applications. Contracts are checked at runtime, and
can provide useful diagnostic information when an error is
encountered. But, as with other testing techniques, interface
contracts cannot provide any information about bugs that are
not triggered by the testing regime.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have developed an approach for modeling TinyOS
applications using the process algebra CSP. Our approach
consists of a mapping from nesC to CSP, and a model of
the TinyOS scheduling and preemption mechanisms.
Our approach to modeling and analyzing TinyOS appli-
cations is complementary to verification methods such as
testing and runtime contract checks. Its benefits include:
• Analyses that can uncover unlikely, but undesirable,
interleavings, allowing the discovery of low-probability
bugs that might otherwise go undetected until the
application has been widely deployed.
• Avoidance of the need to create explicit input scenarios,
since model-checking involves exhaustive state-space
exploration.
• Generation of counterexample traces when an error is
detected, providing a clear indication of the sequence
of commands and events that led to the error.
• The ability to evaluate new application designs, or
proposed variations on existing designs, without going
to the effort of creating a full implementation, and to
carry out refinement-checking of application models
against abstract models of network-level behavior.
Our modeling approach does have some limitations. It
does not yet support representation of function arguments,
or of parameterized interfaces. Both are a subject of future
work. Nor does the model described herein support multiple
simultaneous calls to the same function, although an exten-
sion that would do so appears to be relatively straightforward
should it prove necessary to model that situation.
As with any application of model-checking, state-
explosion is a concern. The refinement assertion in sec-
tion IV-B takes ∼6 seconds to check on a 2.4 GHz laptop.
Checking the same refinement assertion on a model that
includes the packet reception and LED features of the full
RadioSenseToLeds application takes ∼ 8 seconds, and
requires the use of slightly more complicated scheduling and
preemption models that provide identical behavior to those
presented here, but are better tuned to the way FDR2 oper-
ates. The analysis of larger applications will inevitably re-
quire even more time, although predicting the exact amount
of time is difficult since it depends on the structure of the
application model. FDR2 does provide the ability to apply
various state-space compression techniques [7], but we have
not yet had the opportunity to evaluate their effectiveness for
reducing the time required to analyze TinyOS application
models. Ultimately, judicious use of abstraction is likely to
be the key to successfully checking very large applications.
At present, our application models are constructed entirely
by hand. We have begun work on a tool that will automate
the generation of CSP models from nesC code. Our initial
efforts are focused on translating just the nesC syntax, how-
ever it should also be possible to extract information from
interface contracts to generate more constrained models that
better reflect the intended use of components. Automated
translation to CSP should make it easier to analyze existing
applications for errors, which in turn would be helpful in
identifying common errors that might be avoided through
coding guidelines or additional compiler checks.
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